


# Securing Mobile and Wireless Networks

**Will Ivancic**

**wivancic@grc.nasa.gov**

**216-433-3494**



# Outline




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- Network Security, What is it?
- Security Truths
- Mobile and Wireless Networks
- Issues / Challenges
- USCG/NASA/Cisco Neah Bay Project
- Military Scenarios
- Conclusions



# Network Security – What is it?




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- !!! Policy !!!
- Encryption
- AAA (Authentication, Authorization and Accounting)
- Architecture
- Confidentiality
- Prevention, Detection and Correction



# Security Truths




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1. Security is necessary
2. Security is painful
  - At least to date it is
3. Security breaks everything
  - Well, enough things so that it appears to break everything
  - Lots of ingenuity required to make things work

New IETF End-to-End concept/reality is application-to-application rather than to machine-to-machine → due to middleware.



# Security Truths





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
- Security  $\uparrow$  Bandwidth Utilization  $\downarrow$
- Security  $\uparrow$  Performance  $\downarrow$
- Tunnels Tunnels Tunnels and more Tunnels
- Performance  $\downarrow$  Security  $\downarrow$   
 $\Rightarrow$  User turns OFF Security to make system usable!
- Thus, we need more bandwidth to ensure security.





# Mobile and Wireless Networks

## What Do We Mean?



# Entire Networks in Motion - Mobile Router (One View)




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# Mobile Network (Another View)



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

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
- Mobile users rather than mobile networks
- VPNs
- Dial-In
- Wireless LANs
- DHCP

⇒ This is what the corporate user of the airborne Internet “sees” as mobility

⇒ This is the cabin environment









# Issues and Challenges

# Shared Infrastructure






# Asymmetrical Pathing




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
# Reparenting the HA in Mobile-IP



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
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**Reparenting Home Agent  
Helps resolve triangular routing  
Problem over long distances**

Encryption associations break  
when handing off between networks ☹️



# Key Distribution



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
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- Painful
- Difficult
- Needs to be worked to be more manageable and scalable
- Problem grows as network grows
- Sharing infrastructure makes the problem more difficult
- Military key distribution is even worse



Fortunately, this problems is being addressed by industry ☺



# Middleware




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- Firewalls
- Network Address Translators (NATs)
- Performance Enhancing Proxies
- Load Sharing Devices
- Traffic Shapers
- Web Accelerators
- Transparent Proxies
- Normalizers



# Middleware




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- Middleware is a reality and it doesn't appear to be going away. Rather its use is increasing – particularly with regard to network security
- This patchwork of "goop" we're putting in the network may be degrading the performance of the network.
- It is defiantly degrading our ability to figure out what is wrong with the network.
- We need to consider how the architecture should be changed to meet some of the challenges the network faces today that were not issues when the original vision was developed.
  - Deep thinking on architectural principles for the new millennium.



# Example #1




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- GRC personnel ran what appeared to be a complete successful transaction from inside the GRC firewall to a machine at BBN that was outside the GRC firewall.
  - Problem was that the BBN machine had been turned off for six months!
  - GRC proxy spoofed the transaction.
    - So you thought you sold you ENRON shares before it tanked, but you were wrong – only, you didn't know it until it was to late.
    - Or, you thought you sent a successful command to the aircraft, but you were wrong ☹
  - The Network Researchers say something is wrong, it is broken.
  - The Security Implementers say that is the way it is suppose to work.







## Example #2



- Mobile-IP using IPv4
  - GRC firewall blocks UDP traffic
    - Need to open UDP port 436
      - Security Issue (Policy)
  - Triangular routing squashed at GRC proxy/NAT
    - Responses to transactions that originated outside the firewall are blocked by the proxy/NAT which is holding state.
      - Proxy never saw transaction initiated from within GRC network, so response to the transaction is blocked.
      - Reverse tunneling solves problem, at a cost of increased overhead and time delay





# Middleware and Encryption




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
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- Encryption renders most (if not all) Performance Enhancing Proxies (PEPs) useless relative to the encrypted flow.
- Many types of encryption make QoS engineering problematic
  - Protocol header bits hidden (IP in IP)
  - TOS header bits may be hidden

# Neah Bay / Mobile Router Project





# Security Issues Being Addressed



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
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
Satellite Networks & Architectures Branch


- Shared Infrastructure
- Wireless LAN Security
  - Advancements to WEP
- Mixed Address Space
  - NATs and Proxies
- Low Rate Links
- Satellite Links
- Performance over multiple tunnels
- Manageable and Scalable Architecture

# Interim Solution –

HA Directly connected to Internet via DSL







# Protect the MR LAN




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- Firewall between MR LAN and MR as well as HA and Private Intranet
- Tunnels necessary between FAs on Internet and Firewall to provide connection of private address space over public Internet.
- Reverse tunneling required as requests from MR LAN hosts must pass through Proxy inside main firewall.



# HA Outside/Collocated with Main Firewall




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
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- Firewall between MR interfaces and public Internet as well as FA interfaces connecting to the private Intranet and the HA and Private Intranet.
- Multiple VPNs required. One for each possible interface combination.
- Tunnels necessary between FAs on Internet and Firewall to provide connection of private address space over public Internet.
- Reverse tunneling required as requests from MR LAN hosts must pass through Proxy inside main firewall. VPNs take care of this.





# Military Applications




# ATN Security Notes




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- Encryption
  - Still under development
  - Asymmetric Cryptography (Public/Private Keys)
    - Session Specify Secret Key (variant of Diffie-Hellman)
- Message Authentication
  - HMAC, IETF RFC 2104
  - Hash Function(Secure Hash Algorithm Revision One NIST)
- Authentication
  - Digital Signature (elliptic curve variant of Digital Signature Algorithm)
  - Hash Function
  - Asymmetric Enciphered (private key)
  - Certificate Authority
  - Cross-certificates




# Example of Cryptographic Services




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
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## Can CPDLC bandwidth handle encryption and AAA?







# Example of Certificate Environment




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# Conclusions



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- Security is necessary, albeit often painful
- Key distribution and AAA methods need to be developed that ease the deployment
- We need to be aware of middleware
- Increased security requires increased bandwidth and connectivity
- A mobile networks means different things to different people
  - Mobile user
  - Entire networks in motion
- To much security may result in less security
  - Security bypassed for the sake of performance!